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FIDUCIARY SUITS UNDER RULE 10b-5
SEC rule 10b-5 has continually expanded the federal sphere of cor-
porate regulation. The rule's most recent encroachment upon state
corporation law involves the derivative suit for breach of fiduciary
duties. While the Maytag "deception requirement" temporarily im-
peded development in this area, the latest cases demonstrate that it
no longer precludes 10b-5 application. This note analyzes the de-
ception requirement under theories of imputed knowledge, reviews
the limitations upon lOb-5 use, and posits a developing standard for
10b-5 violation.
R ULE lOb-5, 1 the broad antifraud provision promulgated under the
Securities Exchange Act,2 has become, through judicial interpretation,
the most significant weapon in the federal antifraud arsenal.3 The original
purpose of the rule was to extend federal regulation to fraudulent practices
by purchasers of securities, 4 since prior legislation had only encompassed
the acts of fraudulent sellers.3 The need for such extended protection was
felt since, under the existing state of the law, corporate insiders could
'"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1968). The language in part (b) appears to be directed only at the type
of omission which would create a "half truth," but has been interpreted by the courts
to cover total omissions as well. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1964).
'See generally Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARv.
L. REv. 1146 (1965); Comment, Securities Exchange Act-Statutory Fraud Under
Section lob and Rule X-lOb-5, 12 N.Y.L.F. 318 (1966). -
'See Comment, Shareholder Derivative Actions Against Insiders Under Rule
lob-5, 1966 Dunn L.Y. 166, at 168.
Section 17(a) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale
of any securities ... to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud...." 15
U.S.C. § 77q (1964). The section refers to fraud or misrepresentation in the offer or
sale of securities. It is perhaps arguable that this language need not be limited to fraud
by sellers as distinct from fraud by purchasers, but the SEC has never attempted to
apply 17(a) except against fraudulent sellers. See 3 L. Loss, SEcinuTiEs REULATION
1424 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
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acquire the securities of their corporations by fraudulent means with
virtual immunity from federal authority.6 Rule lOb-5 has seen its most
varied and perplexing applications in cases involving corporate officers
or directors. The consistently recurring question has been whether breaches
of fiduciary duty to the corporation, 7 in relation to the purchase and sale
of securities, fall within the regulatory ambit of lOb-5. Beginning with
Ruckle v. Rote American Corporation,8 this note will examine recent
fiduciary duty cases with the purpose of isolating the various theories used
by the courts to either expand or contract the application of 10b-5 in
this area.
Rule 10b-5 expressly prohibits employment of any scheme, artifice
or device to defraud; misrepresentation or omission of any fact material
to a purchase or sale, and participation in any fraudulent activity involving
a purchase or sale of securities.9 Because of the need for flexibility, the
6 1966 DuKE LJ. 168. The spirit behind the passage of the antifraud provisions
was expressed by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc.:
"A fundamental purpose, common to these statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard
of business ethics in the securities industry.. .. 'It requires but little appreciation.., of
what happened in this country during the 1920's and 1930's to realize how essential it
is that the highest ethical standards prevail.'" 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). It was con-
cluded that "general and flexible" antifraud protections were intended, Id. at 199, and
the courts have, on the whole, accorded an expansive ambit to 10b-5's literal scope.
7 Breach of fiduciary duty is a concept arising from common law agency theories.
Fiduciary duties generally arise whenever one is placed in a position of trust to another.
An action for breach of these duties is available in the innumerable factual situations
where the agent acts adversely to the interest of his principal. See generally E. LATTY
& G. F AMPrON, BAsic BusINEss AssOcrATONS 543-78 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
LATr].
Rule lOb-5 fiduciary duties usually arise in two distinct factual contexts: the duty
of officers or directors to corporations, and the duty of investment brokers and advisors
to their clients. The courts have generally been most expansive in their application of
10b-5 to brokers and advisors since the regulation was most obviously directed at these
parties. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1964). Fraud is often
given a special meaning in actions against investment specialists, without common law
limitations being applied. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., 375 U.S.
180 (1963); 1967 Durr LJ. 1061. The use of lob-5 against corporate officers has not
been so broad, and various common law restrictions have been applied. See, e.g., SEC
v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966); Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
" 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
"Unlike § 17(a) of the Securities Act, Rule lOb-5 did not expressly provide a
civil remedy. However, this disparity was eliminated when an implied civil remedy was
recognized in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The
court based its finding of a private right of action upon the tort theory that a cause of
action exists in favor of those parties whose interests are intended to be protected by
the statute. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1964).
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courts have been reluctant to define the exact elements necessary to con-
stitute a lOb-5 cause of action.10 It is generally recogni ed that the rule
extends beyond the restrictive elements of common law fraud,'1 and
actionable deceit has even been defined as the "infinite variety of devices
by which undue advantage may be taken .... , 12 The common law fraud
requirements of deception, causation, and reliance' lhave been emphasized
or ignored, depending upon the policy interests sought to be protected.
The initial application of the rule in the fiduciary area suggested
an expansive use for 10b-5 in regulating corporate dealings relating to
securities transactions,' 4 and the growth of a new area of federal cor-
poration law was predicted.' 5 Against this background of developing
federal power, there emerged with O'Neill v. Maytag' 6 a tendency to-
ward limiting the use of lOb-5 to situations involving actual fraudulent
deception. Breach of fiduciary duties alone was not considered sufficient
to constitute a lOb-5 violation.' 7
The Maytag case involved a stockholders' derivative action '8 wherein
the plaintiff alleged that the corporate directors, in an effort to maintain
103 Loss 1436. The courts have expressed the fear that, once a strict definition is
determined, the unscrupulous will rapidly conceive some means of circumventing it.
But see SEC v. Electrogen Indus. Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. q 92,156, at
96,719 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1968).
11 Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965). The usual justifications
for this extended coverage are the intricacy of the subject area, the important public
interest in maintaining a stable securities market, and the general intent of Congress in
the securities acts to provide the SEC with flexible remedial powers.
" Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
uSee W. PRossER, THE L v op ToRTs § 100-03 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER].
"See McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 368
U.S. 939 (1961). "As implemented by Rule lOb-5 ... Section 10(b) provides stock-
holders with a potent weapon for enforcement of many fiduciary duties. It can be
fairly said that the Exchange Act... constitutes far reaching federal substantive cor-
poration law." Id. at 834.
' See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative
Intent? 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963). But cf. Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of
a Federal Law of Corporations By Implication through Rule l0b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REV.
185 (1964).
339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
"Id. at 768.
Most fiduciary duty cases are prosecuted as derivative actions. The theory of
the derivative claim is that a stockholder will be permitted to sue on behalf of the
corporation for injury suffered by the corporation. See 9 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoRoRA-
TIONS § 4469 (perm. ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER]. Therefore, injurious
deception of the shareholders as individuals has no bearing upon a lOb-5 derivative
claim. These individual concerns are significant only in a private individual action for
lOb-5 fraud.
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their control, negotiated an exchange of stocks with another corporation
at an unfavorable ratio. The court noted that, since the directors of both
the purchasing and selling corporations had full knowledge of the unfair
exchange, there could be no serious claim of deceit. 19 Relying upon
the language of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corporation,20 the court
held that lOb-5 applied only to "that type of misrepresentation or fraud-
ulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities
rather than . . . fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs." 21 In
the absence of deception, a breach of fiduciary duty could not constitute
a 10b-5 violation.22
The result in Maytag was somewhat surprising in light of the Second
Circuit's earlier opinion in Ruckle v. Rote American Corporation.23 Ruckle
was a stockholder action for injunctive relief to prevent a stock issuance 24
at less than value by the directors of the Roto corporation. The court
found the issuance to be fraudulent since a minority of the board of
directors had not been informed of material facts contained in certain
financial statements which would have indicated a higher stock value.
The material omissions were found to be sufficient to bring the transaction
within the 10b-5 definition of fraud.25 However, the court additionally
339 F.2d at 767.
193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). In addition to
requiring that the fraud be of the type "usually associated" with the purchase and sale
of securities, Birnbaum also established the "purchaser-seller test." The actual language
of lOb-5 prohibits fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968). The Birnbaum court interpreted this language to mean
that the plaintiffs themselves must have either purchased or sold securities within the
meaning of the rule in order to maintain a 10b-5 action. But see Vine v. Beneficial
Finance Corp., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Voege v.
American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
2 1339 F.2d at 468.
"Id.
339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). The decision in Ruckle was handed down December
4, 1964. Maytag was decided December 29, 1964. Judge Medina, who wrote the
opinion in Ruckle, did not sit on the Maytag case, but Judges Lumbard and Marshall
considered both cases. Judge Hays, who replaced Medina, dissented in the Maytag
decision, but offered no rationale other than to conclude that a 10b-5 claim did exist.
339 F.2d at 770.
'An issuance is considered a "sale" for the purposes of Rule 10b-5. Hooper v.
Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
814 (1961). It requires an identical volitional element on the part of the corporation.
See notes 74-76 infra. The court concluded in Hooper that: "Considering the purpose
of this legislation, it would be unrealistic to say that a corporation having the capacity
to acquire $700,000 worth of assets for its 700,000 shares of stock.. ." should not
be treated as an injured seller when it actually received nothing. 282 F.2d at 203.
aIn Ruckle, the Court did not consider the causation question, although it is
[Vol. 1968: 791
stated that even if all the directors had full knowledge, the corporation
could still be considered the victim of deceit.26 This dicta directly con-
flicts with the holding of Maytag that there could be no deceit if the cor-
porate officers of both parties had full information. The development
of the case law since the Ruckle and Maytag decisions appears to follow
two divergent paths, one of which applies the Maytag rationale, while
the other relies upon the Ruckle dicta. Recently this deepening conflict
has caused the District Court for the Southern District of New York to
question the continued validity of the Maytag approach.
2 7
It is important initially to explore the legal theories and policies
underlying the Maytag-Ruckle conflict. Both cases articulate the necessity
of deceit for a 10b-5 violation.2 8 In Maytag, however, the court found
no deceit since the corporate directors of both buyer and seller knew
that the stock involved was being exchanged at less than value. The
knowledge of the directors was seemingly imputed to the selling cor-
poration, thereby preventing it from being considered the victim of
deceit. The Maytag opinion apparently relied upon the universally ac-
cepted adage that the "knowledge of directors will be imputed to the
corporation," 29 although the opinion contains no express consideration
apparent that the majority of the board could have carried out the transaction over
the objections of an informed minority. In Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp.
766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the court was more attentive to the causation requirement,
dismissing a 10b-5 claim because the majority could have carried out its injurious plan
on its own. However, in Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
the deception of a minority of the voting power was held sufficient to constitute a
10b-5 violation (as having "some" casual relation). See notes 46-53 infra and accom-
panying text.
^'339 F.2d at 29.
2-'See Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Weitzen v. Kearns,
[1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 41 91,973 (S.D.N.Y. July 20,
1967). See note 95 infra and accompanying text.
'In Ruckle, the court observed that 10b-5 would apply only if "the board
defrauded the corporation into issuing shares .... ." 339 F.2d at 29. In Maytag, the
court expressly held that "there must be allegations of facts amounting to deception
in one form or another; conclusory allegations of deception or fraud will not suffice."
339 F.2d at 768. But cf. notes 104-107 infra and accompanying text.
" 3 FLETCHER § 790. This theory is based upon the conclusive presumption that
the director will communicate any material information he receives to his corporation.
It is apparent that such a theory is necessary to place the fictional "corporate entity"
in the same position as a real person, since, without this imputation, a corporation
would be a perennial "bonafide purchaser" and "innocent party." It would otherwise
gain the benefit of its directors' knowledge without being subjected to any of the
liabilities which such knowledge might impose. There are certain requirements which
must be met, however, before knowledge will be imputed. Genrally the information
must be acquired within the scope of the director's employment, within the time the
Vol. 1968: 791] 10b-5
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of imputation theory. If the Maytag opinion purports to follow strict
imputation doctrine, it would appear to overlook a well-known exception
applicable when directors act from some adverse interest. When an in-
terest adverse to that of the corporation is allowed to influence a transac-
tion, director knowledge concerning the transaction will generally not
be imputed to the company.30 In Maytag, the directors' interest in seeing
the corporate securities exchanged at less than value could easily be
construed as adverse to the company's interest in receiving the highest
possible value for its stocks.3 '
However, another imputation exception, the "sole actor theory," 3 2
may explain the decision in Maytag. The sole actor theory is essentially
an exception to the adverse interest rationale. According to this theory,
when a director or officer is acting adversely, but is the only party through
which the corporation is functioning, his knowledge will be imputed despite
agency existed, and in connection with the particular transaction to which it relates.
Id. at § 819.
' 3 FLETCHER at § 819. The reason offered for this exception is that the agent
cannot be presumed to make information known to his principal when that information
would injure his own interests. Indeed, the presumption is that the agent will conceal
the information. Higgins v. Lansingh, 154 IlM. 301, 40 N.E. 362 (1895). Alternatively,
when an agent acts adversely, he is acting outside the scope of his employment, and
therefore any knowledge gained should not be imputed. See F. MECHEM, LAw oF
AGENCY § 138 (4th ed. 1952).
Although the adverse interest exception has been well accepted, the courts have
been careful not to apply it so as to allow the corporation to evade its proper
responsibilities. "A growing tendency is therefore exhibited ... to look beyond the
corporate form to the purpose of it, and to the officers who are identified with that
purpose." I.J. McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 504, 515 (1910). "[K]nowledge
on the part of the president of a corporation of fraud ...was imputable to the
corporation, where he and his partner... had the entire management and control ....
3 FLETCHER § 819, at 116. See note 33 infra and accompanying text.
I Not every adverse interest is considered sufficient to defeat imputation. Some
courts have required a substantial degree of adversity before applying the exception.
See, e.g., Curtis, Collins & Holbrook Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 215 (1923). The
Maytag court may not have considered the directors' interest to be sufficiently adverse,
since they were profiting only indirectly by maintaining their control, rather than
directly through buying the stocks themselves at less than value. Such a narrow view
of adversity, however, defeats the policy behind the exception and is not in keeping
with the generally accepted test espoused in Fletcher's authoritative treatise on Corpora-
tions: "The true test [is] ... whether, in the premises and under all the circumstances
of the particular case, the agent's interests are so incompatible with the interests of
his principal as practically to destroy the agency or to render it reasonably probable
that an ordinary person, in the agent's position, under such circumstances, will neither
act in behalf of his principal upon his so-acquired knowledge, nor disclose the
knowledge to his principal .. " 3 FLETCHER § 821, at 118.
'See LATTY at 462-67; cf. 3 FLETCHER § 809.
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Vol. 1968: 791]
his adverse interest. 33 In Maytag, since the entire board of directors was
acting adversely, it could be considered the "sole actor" through which
the corporation was able to obtain knowledge. The knowledge of the
adverse acting board would then be imputed to the corporation and it
would consequently not be considered the victim of deceit.3 4 While
not guilty of lOb-5 fraud under this approach, sole actors injuring their
corporations are still liable for their breach of fiduciary duty.35 The
Maytag court may have deemed it more advisable to deal with the di-
rectors' wrongful activities under common law fiduciary duty prohibitions,8 6
'The "sole actor" theory evolved to prevent corporations being operated com-
pletely by adverse parties from isolating themselves from losses and liabilities incurred
by those actors. A typical situation often involved a bank which was completely
dominated by an individual director or group of directors. The bank would accept
some property as collateral, the adverse-acting directors having knowledge of a
superior security interest in the property. If the debtor failed, the bank would claim to
be a bonafide purchaser without notice, arguing that the directors' knowledge should
not be imputed since they had acted adversely by accepting burdened collateral. This
use of the corporate entity fiction to take advantage of third parties, such as the prior
secured creditor in the banking situation, was unacceptable to the courts, and the
knowledge of the adverse acting directors was imputed to their corporation. See, e.g.
Munroe v. Harriman, 85 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1936).
Despite the apparent relevance of the sole actor theory in those cases involving
full director knowledge, the Ruckle dicta need not be viewed as pure judicial disregard
of an otherwise applicable rule of law so as to expand the operative scope of lOb-5.
As previously illustrated, the sole actor rationale is basically an equitable tool utilized
to prevent the actions of adverse directors from redounding to the benefit of the
corporation at the expense of innocent third parties. Equity, however, does not
demand use of the sole actor rule in a Maytag situation. Rather than preventing
corporate benefit at the expense of innocent parties, application of the rule in the
Maytag context serves only to impede redress of corporate injury while insulating
self-serving directors from liability under the Exchange Act. Hence, proper respect
for the purpose of the sole actor theory would foreclose its application in a case such
as Maytag.
"The application of imputation doctrine in Maytag seems to undercut the 10b-5
policy of protecting the investor from intricate securities schemes. Since the "corporate
entity" is the investor in the Maytag situation, it is clear that, despite director knowl-
edge it can be made the victim of the type of scheme lob-5 was intended to prevent
if the directors are themselves the schemers and do not use their knowledge to protect
their corporation. Public policy, therefore, as well as the adverse interest exception,
would appear to require non-imputation in situations such as Maytag.
339 F.2d at 769.
'The type of activity under consideration may be subject to control through
application of state Blue Sky law or common law fiduciary duty theories, but an
action in the federal courts under lob-5 offers a plaintiff some distinct advantages.
Often private actions for civil liability afford the only real opportunity for
enforcement of Blue Sky sanctions. In many states, however, the only remedy
provided is recision of the fraudulent transaction. Most states expressly provide
protection only for injured buyers, leaving sellers to seek redress solely through com-
l0b-5
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than to classify unconcealed activity as fraud under 10b-5. This sensitivity
to common law theory may also have been partly motivated by a desire
to keep corporate fiduciary problems out of the federal sphere.8 7
The Ruckle dicta enunciates a position opposite to the restrictive
Maytag view. In Ruckle, a minority of the board of directors did not have
knowledge of the stock issuance at less than value. In keeping with the
adverse interest exception, the knowledge of the directors participating
in the scheme was not imputed to the corporation, and a lOb-5 violation
was found. Since all of the directors were not involved, the board could
not be considered a "sole actor" in order to defeat non-imputation. There-
fore, the actual holding of Ruckle is not in conflict with traditional im-
putation theories. The dicta to the effect that a corporation can be de-
ceived by its entire board of directors, however, relies totally upon the
adverse interest exception, ignoring the possible application of the sole
actor rule. The court's willingness to reject the fictions of imputed knowl-
edge 8 suggests a preference for treating overt breaches of fiduciary duty
mon law proceedings. Thus, under the law of many states, an injured corporate seller
would not enjoy the type of protection possible under lob-5. In addition, most states
limit Blue Sky law recovery to amounts paid. While some allow recovery of interest,
court costs and attorney fees, only Arizona expressly provides for additional damages.
See 3 Loss 1631-38. Rule 10b-5, on the other hand, contains no limitation on damages.
The derivative suit for common law breach of fiduciary duty is also subject to
substantial limitations. Often the prosecuting shareholders are initially required to
demand satisfaction from the directors, to expressly inform the directors of each
detailed cause of action, and to post bond as security for damages arising from
corporate defense of the claim. See R. BAKER & W. CARY, CORPORATIONs 653, 677-81
(3d ed. 1958). A 10b-5 action in the federal courts does not require the shareholders
to seek redress from the directors where such action would be futile, FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b). Furthermore, the complaint is governed by the more liberal federal standards
of specificity, FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a), the expansive Federal discovery rules are avail-
able, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37, broad venue provisions and extra territorial service of
process may be utilized, Securities Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964), and
often no security bond is required. See Epstein v. Solitron Devices, Inc., CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 92,127 (2d Cir. Jan. 11, 1968); Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 130 F. Supp.
142 (N.D. Ohio 1955). But see Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949).
'See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative
Intent, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963); Note, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 545 (1965).
1 "We come then to the question whether it is possible within the meaning of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for a corporation to be defrauded by a majority of its
directors. We note at the outset that in other contexts, such as embezzlement and
conflict of interest, a majority or even the entire board of directors may be held to
have defrauded their corporation. When it is practical as well as just to do so, courts
have experienced no difficulty in rejecting such cliches as the directors constitute the
corporation and a corporation, like any other person, cannot defraud itself." 339 F.2d
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as fraud, rather than allowing the "sole actor fiction" 39 to defeat the
10b-5 policy of investor protection.40
The Maytag-Ruckle conflict contrasts adherence to traditional legal
theory with concern for statutory policy. Underlying Maytag is an aver-
sion for classifying open activity as fraud and a desire to treat the adverse
activities of corporate directors under traditional state law fiduciary duty
concepts. In the background lurks the fear that federal interference with
corporate duties would be improper without congressional authorization. 4'
Alternatively, the Ruckle approach is supported by the lOb-5 policy of
protecting the investor from fraudulent schemes. The Ruckle court was
apparently unwilling to see this policy thwarted merely because the in-
vestor happened to be a corporation subject to the conceptual difficulties
surrounding the corporate entity fiction. Underlying the Ruckle view
may be a belief that lOb-5 was intended to pertain to breach of fiduciary
duties as well as to traditional fraud. 42 A candid recognition of this idea
at 29 (emphasis added). See 3 FLETCHER § 819. But see 3 FLETCHER § 823, at 128,
§ 824; cf. LTrY at 462-67.
'See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
" A recent implementation of the Ruckle rationale appeared in Heilbrunn v.
Hanover Equities Corp., 259 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). In Heilbrunn, a derivative
claim was laid against the board of directors for exchanging the corporation's securities
for worthless property. Both the corporate directors and the recipients of the securities
knew all material facts, but the court, citing Ruckle, held that the corporation could
be defrauded by all of its directors, and was not barred from relief by the theories of
imputed knowledge. It was recognized that deceit was necessary for a 10b-5 action,
but the deception of the "corporate entity" was found to be sufficient. This non-imputa-
tion rationale successfully implements the 10b-5 policy of protecting the investing
corporation, but ignores the sole actor exception to the adverse interest rule, and
classifies essentially unconcealed activity as deceit. The adverse activity is clearly
overt insofar as the corporation is concerned, since all directors have actual knowledge.
However, since the knowledge of adverse acting directors is not to be imputed, the
adverse activity is theoretically "concealed" from the corporation. Under this rationale
all adverse activities, and therefore all breaches of fiduciary duty, could be considered
"deception' satisfying the requirements of lob-5.
I See, e.g., Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Ruder,
Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication through
Rule lob-5, 59 Nw. U.L. Rav. 185 (1964).
The Entel court displayed this attitude in its quotation of an address by Justice
Harlan to the Federal Bar Association:
"[There is an] increasing tendency to look to the federal courts to set right things
which, under our governmental system, should be left for solution elsewhere ....
[lit evinces impatience with the slowness of reform when sought through the political
process, and, what to many is more disturbing, skepticism as to whether our historic
federal system is any longer adequate to meet the problems confronting modern
American society... ." 270 F. Supp. at 70 n.2.
'
3 Joseph, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. Rv. 171
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would certainly clear up the conceptual difficulties now generated by
manipulation of the theories of imputed knowledge. 43
Limitation of 10b-5 Use. Subsequent to the Maytag decision, fiduciary
cases have consistently voiced reliance upon the Maytag doctrine, although
the actual holdings in many have been based upon strong alternative
grounds.44 The constant attention given to the Maytag requirements in
these cases ultimately led to a recognition in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook 45
(1964). "[lit is not necessary to consider the rule . . . as either a 'fraud rule' or a
'fiduciary duty rule.' Breaches of fiduciary duty come within the terms of the rule only
because the law imposes upon a person occupying a fiduciary position a higher than
ordinary standard of duty with respect to his dealings with those for whose benefit
he is supposed to act. It is thus... in a sense both a 'fraud rule' and a 'fiduciary duty
rule ... ." Id. at 178.
' The commentators have disagreed as to the relative merits of extending lOb-5
into the area of corporate regulation, but some consensus exists for the proposition
that the Rule should not be interpreted to cover general breaches of corporate fiduci-
ary duty. See Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV.
1146, 1166 (1965). The opponents of 10b-5 extension object to the "topsey turvey,"
case by case development of the rule; See Dykstra, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5,
1967 UTAH L. REv. 207, 221, and suggest that federal regulation of corporations could
better be effected through a careful legislative program. Those who support the so-
called common law development of a federal corporation law-suggest that lob-5 be
viewed as both a "fraud rule and a fiduciary duty rule . . ."; Joseph, Civil Liability
Under'Rule lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 171, 178 (1964), and reject the
argument that Congress intended the rule to be limited by the elements of an action
based upon common law fraud and deceit. 375 U.S. at 195. The proponents of federal
extension focus upon the public policy of insuring fair dealing in the securities market,
and suggest that the strictest requirements must be imposed upon those occupying
fiduciary positions.
In Chasin v. Mensher, 255 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), for example, the
court noted that the plaintiff was really complaining of a mismanagement of corporate
affairs, and suggested that under the Maytag requirement of deception, Rule lob-5
would not apply. However, ultimate decision of the lOb-5 issue was reserved, since the
plaintiff had not purchased or sold as a result of the mismanagement, and therefore
failed to qualify as a proper plaintiff under the Birnbaum rule. See note 20 supra. In
Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the lOb-5 claim was dismissed
because the disputed stock was acquired through an amalgamation which could not
properly be considered a purchase. The court, however, rationalized its decision under
the Maytag deceit requirement, finding that all directors of both purchaser and seller
had full knowledge of the transaction. The plaintiff's reliance on Ruckle was expressly
rejected, that case being distinguished on its facts. The opinion in Carliner v. Fair Lanes
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25 (D. Maryland 1965), expressed approval of the Maytag rationale
as well as the theory that "the Federal courts should not get involved in working out
federal rules to govern every aspect of corporate behavior that involved securities."
Id. at 30. The actual holding of the case, however, was based upon the finding that
the corporation did not pay an excessive price for the stock and was therefore not
damaged.
268 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In Schoenbaum, the court, quoting ex-
tensively from Maytag, seized upon the fact that the directors of both purchaser and
[Vol. 1968: 791
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that the Maytag rule itself was sufficient basis for dismissal of fiduciary
duty claims under 10b-5 in the absence of actual deceit.
However, several other common law theories have also been utilized
to restrict 10b-5 use.46 The causation requirement has seen the most
frequent application. A 10b-5 case may present two distinct causation
problems. First, a question may arise as to whether a particular injury
can be considered a sufficiently direct result of the fraudulent activity.
The courts have at times adopted a strict common law theory of causation
in order to prevent the finding of a lOb-5 violation when the injury was
not an immediate and necessary result of the omission or misrepresenta-
tion.47 Such an approach, however, is not consistent with recent causation
seller had full information, and held that, since there existed no affirmative misrepre-
sentation, no 10b-5 violation could be found. Ruckle was again distinguished on its
facts. The Second Circuit has most recently reviewed the restrictions on 10b-5 use in
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco Inc., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 91,983 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 1967). In the Mutual case the plaintiff stockholders
argued that the seller's failure to reveal intended mismanagement constituted an
"implied representation to deal fairly." The court recognized that deception might take
the form of non-verbal acts, and that it need not be restricted in any common law
sense, but found that the "implied representation not to mismanage" could not be
made a valid basis for a 10b-5 action since such an interpretation "Would convert any
instance of corporate mismanagement into a Rule 10b-5 case." Id. at 96,344. See also
Condon v. Richardson, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. q 92,153 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 1967)
(failure to allege fraudulent or deceitful conduct grounds for dismissal); Levine v.
Great Western Sugar Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. q 92,117 (D.NJ. Sept. 29, 1967)
(dicta requiring deception, misrepresentation or some type of fraud).
"Considering the various doctrines limiting 10b-5 use, the court in Mutual Shares
Corp. v. Genesco Inc., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,983
(2d Cir. Aug. 14, 1967), called attention to the reliance requirement, List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), causation
requirement, Barnet v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). But see
Weber v. Bartle, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sec. L. REP. 91,910
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1967), and the buyer-seller limitation, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). But see A.T. Brod
& Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial Finance Corp., 374
F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
'7 At common law, strict theories of proximate cause expressly limited recovery
for misrepresentation. The injury had to be the direct and foreseeable result of the act
sued upon. Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), a 10b-5 case involving
omissions of substantial assets from stockholders reports and financial statements, is
a recent example. In Hoover, the alleged purpose of the omissions was to depress the
price of the stock so that the corporation might buy it to aid the directors in main-
taining control. The material omissions were clearly recognized, but since the corpora-
tion bought at a depressed rather than an inflated price, the absence of injury was
fatal to the claim. The plaintiff, anticipating this objection, had alleged that the real
injury lay in the waste of corporate assets made possible by the directors gaining
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doctrine. Recovery for misrepresentation will not ordinarily be denied
where the fraudulent acts or omissions are a material and substantial factor
in bringing about the final injury.48 Hence, strict proximate cause require-
ments for 10b-5 seem unduly harsh in light of the "substantial factor"
test generally utilized in misrepresentation cases.
The most important fiduciary situation in which a lOb-5 causation
issue arises relates to a deception of merely a minority of the board of
directors. Where only a minority is deceived, it has often been held that
the deception cannot be considered the cause of the injury since the
minority lacked the voting power to bring about any differing result. 49
This rationale is also vulnerable under the "substantial factor" test. Even
though a minority lacks the voting power to block an injurious plan, it
could, if informed of the scheme, take other action to prevent its con-
sumation. State law, for example, might be utilized to enjoin or void
the objectionable transaction." Thus, the concealing of information from
a minority should be considered at least a substantial factor in the ac-
complishment of a fraudulent plan. In Ruckle v. Roto American Corpora-
tion,51 the deception of a minority was not fatal to the plaintiff's claim,
control. The court held that this waste may have been facilitated by the omissions,
but was not directly caused by it, and that therefore no lOb-5 violation could be found.
IThe "substantial factor test" is a common method of attempting to articulate
the elusive causation requirement of tort law, and has been utilized with greater ease
than traditional proximate cause concepts. Under this test, if a particular happening
can be termed a "substantial factor," although not the only or even the most significant
factor in bringing about a result, that happening will be considered a legal cause of
the result. See PnossER § 49, at 286.
In the recent lOb-5 case of Vine v. Beneficial Finance Corp., 374 F.2d 627
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967), a substantial factor rationale was
applied through the finding of a unitary fraudulent scheme which resulted in the final
injury. While the very acts sued upon did not cause direct and immediate harm to the
plaintiff, they were found to be part of a total fraudulent plan which did bring about
injury. The acts could therefore be considered a substantial factor in causing the
harm, and 10b-5 recovery could be properly allowed. Id. at 635.
"See, e.g., Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Barnett v.
Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In Anaconda, the plaintiff alleged
that certain proxy statements omitted material facts in order to reduce the apparent
value of Wire and Cable stock, thereby inducing the shareholders to sell out for less.
Although such omissions satisfied the requirement for deceit, the court noted that the
directors had control of more than 73% of the stock, and could therefore have carried
out the transaction despite minority opposition. Consequently it was held that no lOb-5
violation could be found since the fraud did not cause the sale at less than value.
5'See note 36 supra.
t 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). In Ruckle, the directors lacking the material in-
formation constituted only a minority of the board. It is apparent that the majority had
sufficient voting power to carry out their plans, so that the withholding of information
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and, in Globus, Incorporated v. Jaroif,52 the court expressly recognized
that minority deception bears a sufficient causal relationship to the re-
sulting injury to allow 10b-5 relief.53
The common law fraud requirement of scienter has also been applied
with great disparity in 10b-5 situations.54 Scienter has been defined as
covering "everything from knowing falsity with an implication of mens rea,
through the various gradations of recklessness, down to such non-action
as is virtually equivalent to negligence or even liability without fault... . , 55
For the purposes of 10b-5, it has recently been described as the knowl-
edge, or reasonable opportunity to know, that the statements made
here were incomplete or untrue.56 Cases requiring scienter reason that,
without such a requirement, 10b-5 would basically duplicate the protec-
tions of sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Exchange Act, 57 without
the limited liability and statute of limitations provisions of those sections.58
from the minority, although it might well be a material omission, would not seem to
be the proximate cause of the injury under a strict view of causation. The Ruckle court,
however, did not address itself to the causation question, perhaps tacitly assuming the
existence of "some causal relationship" or applying an unarticulated substantial factor
test sufficient to satisfy the more liberal causation theories expressed by the court in
Globus Inc. v. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See note 52 infra.
"' 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In Globus, the plaintiff brought a derivative
action on the ground that the stockholders had been defrauded into approving a
disadvantageous merger deal. Stockholder approval, however, was not actually neces-
sary to confirming the fraudulent sale since the directors controlled over 73% of the
stock and could have approved the deal themselves. The defendant argued that, since
stockholder approval was not needed, fraud in obtaining that approval could not be
considered the proximate cause of the injury. The court, however, noted that only a
minority of the "voters" were deceived in Ruckle and held that only some causal
relationship was required. Id. at 530. This liberal interpretation of the causation
requirement emphasizes the policy of investor protection and openly recognizes that a
deception of even a minority of voters can have causal effect, since a minority could
probably raise sufficient public objection to prevent injurious action, even if it tech-
nically lacked the voting power to block the activity.
1266 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
'See Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964) (scienter required). But
see SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F.
Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), alfd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) (scienter not
necessary).
3 Loss 1432-3.
1 Comment, Shareholder Derivative Actions Against Insiders Under Rule 10b-5,
1966 DuKE L.J. 172 n.34.
57 15 U.S.C. § 77k, (1964).
'See Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964). The recent application
of lob-5 in an increasing variety of factual instances beyond the scope of sections 11
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On the other hand, cases which dispense with the scienter requirement
concentrate on the intent of Congress to provide a new cause of action
not limited by the strict requirements of common law fraud."0
The scienter issue may arise in two varieties of fiduciary duty suits.
The first involves the fiduciary duty of an investment broker or advisor
to his client.60 The high degree of special duty found in this relationship 01
has resulted in a fairly liberal view of the scienter requirement. 62 A sec-
ond factual instance involves the fiduciary duty of directors to their
corporation. Because the applicability of lOb-5 to breaches of corporate
fiduciary duty has been unclear, due to the deception problem of Maytag,
suits of this type have generally not been attempted unless a strong
scienter element was apparent.0 It would seem, however, that, once the
applicability of lOb-5 is established, the high degree of loyalty generally
required of the corporate fiduciary should result in as loose a scienter
requirement as that applied in the investment situation.
With regard to corporate fiduciary duty cases, the conflict in scienter
requirements may be at least partially rationalized on the basis of factual
differences in the cases. Generally, in those cases in which a strict scienter
test was articulated, the particular acts in question were of an innocent
or unintentional nature, and the court was reluctant to label such acts as
fraud. On the other hand, in cases in which a broader form of scienter
was recognized, the actors were more clearly behaving wrongfully, and
the court was concerned with seeing the violations punished. Hence, it
can be posited that the degree of scienter required will seemingly depend
upon the apparent unfairness of the acts in question.6
and 12 detracts from the argument that without a scienter requirement, mere duplica-
tion of coverage would exist. See, e.g., A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393
(2d Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial Finance Corp., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 970 (1967).
'SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
A major case now pending before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), noted in 65 Micit. L. Ruv.
944 (1967) and 80 HARv. L. REv. 468 (1966), may resolve the scienter conflict. The
implication of the district court opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur was that scienter was
not mandatory to support the 10b-5 cause of action.
I See Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
"See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
'See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
"'See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Hell-
brunn v. Hanover Equities Inc., 259 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Compare Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964) with SEC v. Van Horn,
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Another variation of the scienter question arises with reference
to the purpose of the misrepresentation. In two recent cases, Lorenz v.
Watson 5 and Howard v. Levine,66 10b-5 recovery was denied because
certain misrepresentations in government financial statements were not
made for the purpose of defrauding stock purchasers, but rather to de-
ceive the government. This utilization of a "purpose" test invokes the
strictest form of scienter, bordering on specific intent. Since a "watered
down" form of scienter is all that is usually required under lOb-5, 67 it
would seem that misrepresentations knowingly made should be sufficient
to constitute violation, regardless of the ultimate purpose behind the
untruth. 8 It may be that the purpose test confuses scienter with those
misrepresentation rules governing scope of liability. Traditionally, a
party has been liable for misrepresentation only to the class to which the
misrepresentation is made.69 Hence, the defendants in Lorenz and Howard
might arguably escape liability on the theory that their representations
were not made to a class of stock purchasers, rather than on the theory
that their purpose was not to deceive this group. The recent tendency
in other areas of misrepresentation, however, has been to extend liability
even to those whom there is no desire to influence, so long as their re-
liance on the misrepresentation can reasonably be anticipated.70 Adoption
of a strict purpose test is, therefore, contrary to the general extension
of liability for misrepresentation. Invocation of a purpose test also injects
needless confusion into the lOb-5 area by requiring the courts to deal with
yet another fraud concept which, in effect, adds nothing to traditional
scienter and scope of liability principles.
The purpose test poses a special danger to 10b-5 fiduciary suits,
since its application could create a convenient loophole for directors
whose deceptive activities are only incidental to a broader scheme of
371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963);
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). See also Allico Nat'l Corp. v. Amal-
gamated Meatcutters, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. q 92,185 (7th Cir. Apr. 16, 1968)
(allegation of wrongful conduct sufficient); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258
F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (implication that scienter is not required under lOb-5).
258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
88 262 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
673 Loss 1766.
"3See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (1968). The use of the language "operates or
would operate as a fraud," instead of language concerning intent or purpose, seems to
indicate that schemes which function to defraud are covered, whether or not the fraud
is the ultimate purpose of the scheme.
I See PxossER § 102, at 715, 717.
71 Id. at 718-19.
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maintaining control, and are therefore not committed with a "purpose"
to defraud.71 Such an application would clearly be contrary to the in-
tended scope of 10b-5 protection, especially in light of the recent tendency
to extend 10b-5 prohibition to the "general fraudulent scheme." 72
A final limitation upon 10b-5 use is the purchaser-seller require-
ment. The purchaser-seller limitation was initially placed upon 10b-5 in
Birnbaum v. Newport Corporation 73 which held that, in order to qualify
for recovery under 10b-5, a plaintiff must have either purchased or sold
securities. Those injured by a sale transaction, but not themselves pur-
chasers or sellers, were denied protection. Crucial to the application
of the Birnbaum rule was whether a particular transaction constituted a
"sale." The volitional element on the part of the seller became the signif-
icant test.74 Mergers or stock issuances which required shareholder ap-
proval were considered sales, 75 while involuntary exchanges of stock, such
as short form mergers, were not so considered. 7 However, in the recent
'See Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
"See Vine v. Beneficial Finance Corp., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (1967); Weber v. Bartle, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. q 92,158 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 1, 1968).
- 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
?See, e.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 267 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Il. 1966),
rev'd, 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). In Dasho, the district
court held that involuntary conversions or "forced sales" subsequent to merger trans-
actions could not be considered sales for the purposes of 10b-5 because they were
consumated without any voluntary act on the part of the seller. The court of appeals
reversed this position, 380 F.2d at 268, emphasizing the public policy of investor
protection.
'See, e.g., Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Simon v.
New Haven Board & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966).
" See Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 267 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ill. 1966), rev'd, 380
F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). See also Cohen v. Colvin, 266
F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
A statutory merger, or "short form" merger, does not require the approval of the
shareholders whose stock is being converted into securities of the surviving corporation.
A transaction of this type usually requires that the surviving corporation obtain at
least 90% of the outstanding stock of the corporation being acquired. At this time, the
remaining outstanding shares are "automatically" converted into the shares of the
surviving corporation, without any action on the part of the owners of these outstand-
ing shares. See National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 134 F.2d 689 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943). But cf. Vine v. Beneficial Finance Corp., 374
F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) ("Sale" found in involuntary
merger transaction).
The rationale behind refusing to treat such automatic conversions as "sales" is
that they lack the volitional element usually found in a sales transaction. This dis-
tinction is somewhat inter-related with the strict causation requirement, since if the
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case of Vine v. Beneficial Finance Corporation,77 even an involuntary
sale was held sufficient to satisfy the purchaser-seller test. The Vine court
reasoned that since the corporation in which the plaintiff owned shares
had ceased to exist, he would eventually have to redeem his stock certif-
icates for cash value, thus becoming "party to a sale." 78
Voege v. American Sumatra Incorporated 79 relied upon a different
approach to circumvent the purchaser-seller requirement. Voege also
involved an involuntary merger, but the plaintiff did not sell or relinquish
her stock certificates. The court, however, looked back to the plaintiff's
original purchase of the stock in question, and found an initial implied
representation that the seller would deal fairly.80 The subsequent unfair
acts were related back to the implied promise of fair dealing in order
to qualify the plaintiff as a "deceived purchaser" under lOb-5. While
this "relation back" technique may still be utilized in some situations, the
implied representation of fair dealing has recently been criticized and
rejected in Mutual Funds Incorporated v. Genesco, Incorporated 8 1 on
the ground that it would cause all unfair transactions subsequent to a
stock purchase to be encompassed under lOb-5.
With the elimination of the purchaser/seller test, the scope of lOb-5
coverage will be greatly extended.8 2 Plaintiffs need no longer be parties
to a sale. While some kind of exchange will probably still be required,
any party whose injury was substantially caused by the fraudulent trans-
action will be allowed recovery under lOb-5. Although some may object
to this expansion, it must be recognized that the Birnbaum limitation was
only a judicial interpretation of the rule and therefore properly subject
to judicial alteration. While the language of lOb-5 specifically forbids
fraudulent activities "in connection with the purchase or sale," 83 there
is nothing in the language of the rule itself to suggest that other injured
parties should be precluded from recovery. Indeed the legislative history
sale is involuntary, it is difficult to maintain that a buyer or seller was fraudulently
misled into making it. See notes 47-52 supra and accompanying text.
7T 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). See also Dasho v.
Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
374 F.2d at 634.
241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
60Id. at 375.
1 [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,983 (2d Cir. Aug. 14,
1967).
11967 Durxn L.. 901. But see Mooney v. Vitolo, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,116 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1967); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Curtis Publishing Co., CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,105 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1967).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
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and purpose behind section lOb suggests that the broadest remedial pro-
tection was intended.94 While the courts have yet to expressly reject the
Birnbaum standard, it is clear from the recent cases that a broad remedial
approach is being taken.85
Extensions of 10b-5 Use. A unique method for avoiding the Maytag-
Ruckle deception problem, and allowing lOb-5 relief when all directors
of a corporation have knowledge of a fraudulent scheme, is the finding
of "deceit upon the shareholders as a decision-making body." 86 In sit-
uations where shareholder approval is required for a transaction, deception
of the shareholders can be treated as if it had been worked upon the di-
rectors themselves, since the shareholders are essentially serving in the
capacity of directors for the purpose of approving the transaction. The
deception requirement is therefore satisfied, and lOb-5 recovery may be
allowed. Although this approach does provide a rationale for lOb-5
protection where it is needed, it would allow adverse acting directors to
avoid liability by simply seeking another means of implementing their
injurious plan which did not necessitate shareholder approval. The di-
rectors could bring about essentially the same injuries to the corporation
and shareholders, while still being shielded by the Maytag deceit require-
ment, so long as shareholder approval was not utilized as a means to
defraud.
An extension of the decision-making body theory, however, sug-
gests a broad lOb-5 approach which could encompass all breaches of
" SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
"See generally Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era
for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. R v. 268 (1968).
'See Globus Inc. v. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Simon v. New
Haven Board & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966). In Simon, a deriva-
tive action, the plaintiff alleged a lOb-5 violation in a merger transaction which
allowed more than fair value for the stock acquired. Since the directors of both
"buyer" and "seller" had knowledge of the overallowance, the defendant urged that
the necessary elements of deception were lacking. The court, however, focused upon
misleading statements concerning the assets of the acquired corporation in the proxy
statements prepared for the merger vote. The statements were held to constitute
deception of the corporation through its stockholders as the "decision making body."
The imputed knowledge of the directors was not considered to bar the corporation
from relief. The theory of stockholder deception has thus far been relied upon by the
courts only when the shareholders are somehow serving in a decision making capacity;
since in this situation the shareholders are essentially serving as directors, it seems
entirely reasonable to treat the deception as if it had been worked upon the directors
themselves. See also Pappas v. Moss, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,181 (3d Cir. Apr.
9, 1968), in which the court suggested that "deception" could be found by viewing the
shareholders as "standing in the place of the defrauded corporate entity.... ." Id. at
96,878,
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fiduciary duty. It can be argued that the shareholders of a corporation
should always be considered a "decision-making body" in reference to
corporate stock transactions. If they are aware of an injurious activity,
shareholders may be able to react by waging a proxy fight, voting out
the directors, or voiding the transaction under state corporation law.8 7
Thus, concealment of directors' breaches would result in stockholder
decisions or actions different than would occur if the injurious activity
had been revealed. With regard to these decisions, the stockholders could
be considered "deceived as the decision-making body." It would then
only be necessary for some injury to result from the deception to complete
the requirements for a cause of action.
Although this analysis is arguably tenable, and would implement
the 10b-5 policy of investor protection, it suffers from the same faults
as the court's play upon doctrines of imputed knowledge.88 It is an
artificially construed rationale supplied to justify lOb-5 coverage of fiduciary
duties. It would be far less confusing to simply admit that a breach of
fiduciary duty itself constitutes a 10b-5 violation, and thus avoid the
necessity of such judicial maneuvering.
The "implied representation" rationale of Voege v. American Sumatra
Incorporated89 represents another judicial method for utilizing lOb-5
in situations involving no actual deceit. In Voege, the requisite 10b-5
deception was found in an implied representation made by the directors
to the plaintiff at the time she purchased her stock that they would
"deal fairly." 0o It is apparent that if such a representation were implied
in every stock purchase, all subsequent unfair acts could be treated
under a theory of misrepresentation of intent 91 at the time of purchase,
'See, e.g., Taormina v. Antelope Mining Corp., 110 Cal. App. 2d 314, 242 P.2d
665 (1952). Twenty-five states have provision in their Blue Sky Laws by which a
fraudulent stock transaction may be voided on suit by the shareholders. 3 Loss 1632.
Most of these state statutes expressly provide for a right to recision of the fraudulent
transaction, and some allow additional recovery for interest, court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees. Id. at 1637-38.
'See notes 29-3 3 supra and accompanying text.
"241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
"Id. at 375.
'Under the orthodox view there must be a misrepresentation of fact before re-
covery for fraud can be allowed. See PRossEn § 104, at 744. If matter other than fact
is misrepresented, it is considered not material, or the plaintiff is presumed not to have
relied on it. The question then arises whether a representation of intent can be con-
sidered one of fact. Lord Bowen's classic view that "The state of man's mind is as
much a fact as the state of his digestion," Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 359
(1882), has been accepted in virtually all American jurisdictions. See PRossER 745.
The intent or state of mind of a stock purchaser or seller at the time of the transaction
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thus allowing lOb-5 relief in virtually every situation involving a transfer
of securities. Since use of this rationale would result in an impossibly
broad ambit of lOb-5 coverage, the implied representation approach has
been actively rejected by both the courts and the SEC.92
CONCLUSION
As even a brief perusal of the recent case law will demonstrate, the
Maytag-Ruckle deception conflict has injected considerable confusion
into the area of lOb-5 violation.93 In attempting to avoid the deception
problem, or provide alternative resolutions, tortuous imputation, causation,
scienter and purpose theories have been generated. A resolution of the
Maytag-Ruckle conflict recognizing openly that breaches of fiduciary
duty, while not deceit, will nonetheless be treated as lOb-5 violations
would avoid the necessity for the theories of "constructive deception"
which have created so many conceptual difficulties. Once lOb-5 coverage
of the fiduciary area is recognized, the related theories of causation,
scienter and purpose may be returned to more traditional roles, since the
basic issue of 10b-5 applicability will be resolved.
can therefore be considered a fact capable of misrepresentation. The Voege approach
carries this one step further in that the representation of an intent to deal fairly is
implied from the mere existence of a sale transaction.
'See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc. [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. RE'. 91,983 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 1967).
In Genesco, the plaintiff's lOb-5 claim was classified by the court as complaining
that the defendants impliedly represented to the world at large that they would not
mismanage the corporation if they acquired control, and that the plaintiffs relied on
this when they bought their stock. The SEC in an amicus brief pointed out that any
stockholder could plausibly argue that at the time of purchase he relied on an implied
representation by management not to mismanage. The Commission argued that if the
plaintiff's proposition were accepted, it would convert any instance of corporate mis-
management into a 10b-5 case. See Lester v, Presco Indus., Inc., [1964-1966 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,562 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
I The question of whether lob-5 applies to breaches of corporate fiduciary duty
has recently given rise to the proposal of Rule lob-10, SEC Exchange Act Release
No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968), to provide special treatment for such breaches in the
specialized area of the investment company. The directors of mutual funds and invest-
ment companies are often responsible for wasting fund assets in paying more than
value for securities purchased for the fund. See H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 172 (1966). Since these directors clearly have knowledge of the breach, the
applicability of 10b-5 has been questioned because of the absence of deception. See
1967 DuKE L.J. 1062. Consequently, Rule lOb-10 has been framed in language spe-
cifically prohibiting waste, rather than in the more general terms of an antifraud
provision. If promulgated, it should provide express fiduciary duty coverage, at least
in the specialized area of the investment company.
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One recent case, Entel v. Allen,94 took a major step toward this
resolution of the problem by recognizing that 10b-5 must now be inter-
preted to extend to undisclosed breach of state law fiduciary duty. 5
The Entel court based its somewhat innovative decision upon two recent
cases decided by the Second Circuit, A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow 96 and
Vine v. Beneficial Finance Corporation.9 7 In Brod, the district court had
relied upon Maytag in dismissing the complaint since it found neither
deception as to the value of the stocks, nor any fraud "usually associated
270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), noted in 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 978 (1967).
270 F. Supp. at 70. In Entel, the court seemed somewhat perplexed with the
anomalies of the Maytag-Ruckle conflict. In the first consideration of the derivative
claim for sale of stock at less than market value, it was held that no deceit could be
claimed since the directors and the buyer had full knowledge. The complaint was
therefore dismissed under the Maytag rule for failure to state a cause of action. Upon
rehearing, the court reversed its holding, explaining that since its first decision the
continued validity of the Maytag rule had been seriously questioned. Id. at 70.
Nevertheless, the wisdom of rejecting the Maytag requirements was questioned on the
ground "that the extension of... lob-5 ... to 'all fraudulent schemes' would be
better left to Congress than to judicial interpretation...." 270 F. Supp. at 70. This
contention may be criticized on the ground that the Maytag restrictions themselves
were judge-made rules and therefore should be subject to judicial change without the
necessity for legislative action. It can be argued, however, that the accepted judicial
interpretation of "fraud" was paramount in the minds of the legislators when they
drafted the Securities Exchange Act. To alter the definition of that term so as to
encompass breach of fiduciary duty would arguably be a change in the entire scope.
rather than merely the interpretation, of the rule. The Maytag-Ruckle conflict was
also openly recognized in Weitznen v. Kearns, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. q 91,973 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1967). In Kearns, the plaintiff
alleged that the directors of Solitron Corporation issued stock for sale to officers,
employees and their families at a value substantially less than its true worth in light
of certain rapid profit increases. The defendant, relying on Maytag, argued that
lob-5 did not apply because of the absence of deception. The court recognized that
both the directors and the purchasers had true information, but, relying on Ruckle,
pointed out that the corporation could be defrauded by all its directors, and that their
knowledge would not be imputed to the corporation to prevent it from bringing a
lob-5 fraud action. It was further suggested that, if the Maytag decision stood for the
contrary proposition, it was "seriously challenged, if not overruled." Id. at 96,310.
See also Puharich v. Borders Electronics Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,141
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1968) (Maytag no longer a sound basis for argument).
It should be noted that the approach in Kearns was not to recognize that fiduciary
duties were covered under lOb-5, as was done in Entel, but to manipulate the imputa-
tion theories along the lines of the Ruckle approach. See notes 29-33 supra and
accompanying text.
- 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967). Bred was an action by a stockbroker against a
customer who placed orders for various securities, but only paid for those which
increased in value by the time payment was due.
- 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
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with the sale or purchase of securities." 98 The court of appeals reversed,
stating that the district court had construed lOb-5 much too narrowly, and
that the rule was intended to "prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed
involved a garden type variety of fraud, or presented a unique form of
deception." 99 While the Brod approach did not abandon the deception
requirement, it did extend the definition of deception to cover "all fraud-
ulent schemes" without ever attempting to identify any express element
of deceit.
In Vine,100 the Second Circuit further debilitated the deception
requirement. It was the plaintiff's theory in Vine that the directors' use
of their fiduciary positions in "shaping the transaction in such a way"
that they received more for their shares than other stockholders con-
stituted a "fraudulent scheme" in violation of 10b-5.101 The defendant,
of course, contended that there had been no deceit practiced upon the
plaintiff. The court recognized that there had been no representations,
statements or communications between plaintiff and defendant, and that
the plaintiff could not have relied in any way upon the defendant, since
the sale was involuntary. Attention, however, was directed to prior
voluntary sales by shareholders of the plaintiff's class which led to the
conditions under which the defendant could force the short form merger.
The court found "deception" of the voluntary sellers, but did not articulate
the manner of deception, except to indicate that the prior sellers did not
have full knowledge of the directors' activities.' 02 The court's reference
was presumably to a lack of knowledge on the part of the prior sellers
that the directors had breached their fiduciary duty by failing to seek
a cash merger through which the shareholders would have received a
higher value for their stock. This prior deception, coupled with the
subsequent forced sale by the plaintiff, was classified by the court as
"part of a single fraudulent scheme," 103 and the complaint was held to
contain sufficient allegations of deception. Again, as in Brod, the approach
9375 F.2d at 396.
"Id. at 397.1 In Vine, the plaintiff alleged that Beneficial conspired with directors of the
Crown Corporation, in which the plaintiff owned stock, to merge Crown into Beneficial
at a price substantially less than Crown's true worth. The directors owned the con-
trolling stock in Crown and were paid more than value for it by Beneficial. 375 F.2d
at 630-3 1.
' 374 F.2d at 631.
2 Id.
3MId. at 635:
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of the court was to technically require deception, but then to find such
deception in activity which constituted a total fraudulent scheme. The
facts of the case were not dissected in order to reveal any express misrepre-
sentation or other traditional fraudulent activity. This approach was
actually carried one step further in the Vine case, since the deception
was apparently found in a lack of knowledge on the part of prior sellers
that fiduciary duties were being breached. Rather than openly recognizing
that fiduciary duties fall within the ambit of 10b-5, the court instead
found a nebulous fraudulent scheme, with failure to "reveal" the breach
of fiduciary duty constituting the deception. Hence, while deceit is still
technically required under 10b-5, the recent cases clearly demonstrate
that the range of activities which will satisfy the deception requirement
has been greatly broadened. It now apparently encompasses breach of
fiduciary duty, at least where such breach is "undisclosed," 104 as will
almost invariably be the case.103
A final resolution of the Maytag-Ruckle question, however, will
necessitate a clear determination of deceit requirements by the Second
Circuit. The emerging elements of lOb-5 deceit likely to be required
can be gleaned from a survey of the case law. Misrepresentations and
omissions of material facts are certainly recognized as lOb-5 deceit.
In addition, many factual situations constituting breach of fiduciary duty
under state law, such as appropriation of corporate opportunities, waste
of corporate assets, misuse of inside information, and general failure
to act in the corporation's best interest, now apparently fall within the
ambit of 10b-5, 06 where the questionable transaction is related to the
purchase or sale of securities. The fraud is to be found in the directors'
"If an undisclosed scheme to breach State contract law is encompassed by
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, then an undisclosed scheme to breach State corporate
fiduciary law must also be covered. Although the SEC's argument for this interpreta-
tion of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 was rejected in O'Neill, it appears to have been
adopted in Brod." Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
' Directors would, of course, be unwilling to reveal their breaches of fiduciary
duty since, although they might thereby avoid lOb-5 prosecution, they would leave
themselves open to state law derivative suits, as well as possible Blue Sky law action.
In addition, such revelations would undoubtedly discredit both the directors and the
corporation in the public eye, and substantially effect the value of the corporation's
stock.
See Braasch v. Muscat, CCII FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,148 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8,
1968) (plan to siphon off and misappropriate funds could be lOb-5 violation);
Puharich v. Borders Electronics Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,141 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 24, 1968) (allegation of manipulative scheme sufficient for lOb-5 cause of action);
Ferraioli v. Cantor, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,101 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 1967) (sale
by majority at a premium may be lOb-5 violation).
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failure to reveal their breaches of fiduciary duty to the "corporate entity."
As the directors themselves are the "eyes and ears of the corporation,"
it is difficult to see how they could make their breaches of duty known
to the corporate entity, since their knowledge as directors will not be
imputed.107 The result is that all breaches of fiduciary duty may be
considered "unrevealed," and will therefore constitute material omis-
sions which are a fraud upon the corporation. 08 The court of appeals
may reject this somewhat fictional view of imputed knowledge, however,
and openly recognize that breaches of fiduciary duty in the purchase and
sale of securities constitute lOb-5 violations.
The courts seem to be returning to the type of definition expressed
in Cady Roberts 109 that 10b-5 fraud consists of "the infinite variety of
devices by which undue advantage may be taken .... 110 The finding of
lOb-5 fraud in Voege v. American Sumatra Corporation was based upon
the failure of the defendant "to deal fairly" with the plaintiff.' Fraud
in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Corporation was found to exist in the
"shaping [of] the transaction in such a way" that some shareholders
received less for their stock than others."12 Language in A. T. Brod v.
Perlow condemning "all fraudulent schemes ...whether ...a garden
type variety . . or .. . a unique form of deception" suggests a broad
See notes 29-3 3 supra and accompanying text.
'A possible alternative to this conclusion is to impute director knowledge to the
corporation, but to find deceit if the breach of fiduciary duty is concealed from the
shareholders. See Pappas v. Moss, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,181, at 96,878 (3d
Cir. Apr. 9, 1968) (shareholders viewed as standing in the place of defrauded corpo-
rate entity). However, corporate directors have traditionally had no duty to make the
corporation's everyday stock transactions known to the shareholders, absent a situation
requiring stockholder approval. See R. BAKER, W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 94, 266, 531
(3d ed. 1958). The breach of fiduciary duty situation might, however, be analogized
to the "special circumstances doctrine" of Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
See also Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and
Disclosure Obligations under Rule 10b-5, 62 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 809 (1968); 20 STAN. L.
REV. 347 (1968). In Repide, it was held that directors owe a duty of revelation
directly to shareholders if special facts are involved in the transaction. A breach of
fiduciary duty might be viewed as such a special fact. Theoretically, under this ration-
ale directors could avoid lOb-5 violation only by making their intended breaches
known to the shareholders. Of course this would seldom occur, and practically
speaking, all breaches of fiduciary duty would be covered under IOb-5. It would seem
more realistic to simply admit that lob-5 applies to breaches of fiduciary duty as well
as fraud, rather than to struggle with principles of imputed knowledge in order to
convert the breaches into deceit.
- 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
"id. at 911.
" 241 F. Supp. 369, 375 (D. Del. 1965).
"374 F.2d 627, 631 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
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prohibition of unfair activities. 1 13 Application of an "ethical unfairness"
test," 4 whether couched in terms of imputation theory, or shrouded in
the cloaks of a general fraudulent scheme, appears to be the emerging
vehicle for interpreting securities fraud "not technically and restrictively,
but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." "5
213 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Allico Nat'l Corp. v. Amalga-
mated Meatcutters, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. (1 92,185 (7th Cir. Apr. 16, 1968)
(allegation of "wrongful conduct" sufficient to state lob-5 cause of action).
' See Note, The Downstairs Insider: The Specialist and Rule 10b-5, 42 N.Y.U.L.
Rav. 695,705 (1967); Comment, A New Concept of Fraud on the Securities Exchange,
15 S.C.L. RaV. 557, 570 (1963). While this ethical unfairness test has been questioned
for failing to provide any definitive standard, see A. BROMDmERG, SEculRuEs LAW:
FRAUD SEC RULE lob-5 4.7 (1967), and allowing too much discretion on the part of
the courts in determining fairness, it certainly provides fair warning that the highest
degree of ethical conduct is expected. The courts have traditionally refrained from
laying down an iron-clad definition of fraud for the express purpose of maintaining
sufficient flexibility to cover the latest innovations. See 3 Loss 1436. The fairness test
is true to this policy and avoids any possible conflict between state and federal law
which might arise if 10b-5 violation were dependent upon whether an act constituted
breach of state law fiduciary duty. Otherwise, results might vary from state to state
depending upon the fiduciary duty theories entertained in the particular jurisdiction.
This result would clearly be detrimental to the regulation of a national securities
market requiring uniform Federal control. Although the "unfairness" standard is
certainly susceptible to some valid criticisms, it appears to be the best articulation to
date of a workable lOb-5 test.
"5375 U.S. at 195.
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